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**Review  
of the  
Bay of Plenty Civil Defence Emergency  
Management Group  
Response to Ex-tropical Cyclones Debbie  
and Cook April 2017**

**Final Report**

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Kestrel Review of Bay of Plenty CDEM Group Cyclone Response Final Report 20171208

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## Executive Summary

This report was commissioned by the Chair of the Bay of Plenty Co-ordinating Executive Group (CEG) of the Bay of Plenty Civil Defence Group to review the Group's response to the impacts of ex-tropical cyclones Debbie and Cook in the period 03-13 April 2017. The review was asked to identify the best practices in the region that supported the response and identify opportunities for the Group to improve its response capability. A copy of the Project Brief for the review is at Appendix 1.

### Findings

The response to the flooding caused by Cyclone Debbie in April 2017 was assessed as generally effective and consistent with legislation and the guidance provided by the Ministry of Civil Defence & Emergency Management, and in accordance with the Group Plan.

The framework for CDEM in the Bay of Plenty is assessed as sound. The Group's Plan is comprehensive and provides a good explanation of how the arrangements are intended to function. The legislation does not hinder a response and when combined with the framework, enables an effective and co-ordinated response. Nevertheless, the Group faces the following challenges:

- Establishing a solid understanding amongst key participants of how the arrangements are expected to operate;
- Ensuring the plans and procedures are comprehensive and up to date;
- Ensuring the appropriate number of staff are available and are trained to the required standard; and,
- During a response, ensuring the system operates as intended by the structure.

### Joint Committee and CEG

The primary function of the Joint Committee is to provide governance and leadership to the CDEM Group by providing the strategic direction and oversight of the policies and planning for CDEM in the region. The Joint Committee is expected to ensure co-ordination occurs between members of the Group and supporting agencies, and is expected to monitor the state of CDEM in the region.

This review considers that:

- The Joint Committee could improve its understanding of the arrangements for CDEM in the region and the Committee's role in it. A formal induction programme and a workshop based on the Group Plan's explanations should be conducted to better understand CDEM arrangements, roles and responsibilities.
- For effectiveness and to show commitment, CEG membership should be at the highest level.

- The Joint Committee could improve its governance of regional CDEM by placing more emphasis on monitoring a programme of work based on improving risk reduction, readiness and response capabilities and include the monitoring of the trained state of staff assigned to response functions, the development of plans and procedures, and the relationships maintained by CDEM with key regional partners.
- The CEG has no statutory role in a response and nor do council Chief Executives unless they are also Controllers. But the knowledge, experience and leadership of Chief Executives should be used to assist the management of the response through the provision of advice, support to the Mayor and councillors, maintenance of routine council functions as much as possible, and ensuring the Controller has the support and council resources required for the response.

### **Emergency Management Bay of Plenty**

When Emergency Management Bay of Plenty (EMBOP) was established, it was agreed the Director of EMBOP would direct and task the routine work of all the Emergency Management Officers in the Group, through an agreed work programme and budget, while enabling the EMOs to maintain close association with Councils for the implementation of CDEM activities. The model adopted was intended to pool CDEM resources and minimise duplication while enabling all Group members to work across all four Rs using the local experience and connections of the local EMO to be supplemented by additional expertise and knowledge available from the pool.

The centralised model as used by the Group however carries some risks:

- Some territorial authorities see it as being too centralised and feel they have lost their EMO and their autonomy.
- EMBOP is perceived to have the responsibility to provide CDEM and not the councils.
- The distance between the EMO and the council is increased and the engagement and connection with EMBOP is weakened.

The structure of EMBOP is assessed as satisfactory but its functioning is not clearly understood by some councils. The key to the centralised approach lies in understanding the model and having an agreed work programme, which would allow each council to specify what it wants to have done. The review recommends the Group discusses the model to ensure contributing councils understand its benefits and to ensure EMBOP can develop a culture of supporting councils and their communities.

### **Declarations**

Through the Group Plan, the Joint Committee and its individual members have delegated the responsibility for controlling and co-ordinating the response to those appointed as Group Controller and local Controllers.

A declaration of a local state of emergency grants emergency powers to the CDEM Group, which are exercised through the Controllers. When a local response is initiated, the role of the Group Controller is to monitor and support the Local Controller, and to co-ordinate support

from across the region for employment by the Local Controller. If the situation escalates to require a region wide declaration (say through more than one territorial local authority being impacted), the Group Controller can assume responsibility for controlling and co-ordinating response activities across the whole region. This includes prioritising efforts, and importantly, directing and controlling the operations managed by sub-ordinate Local Controllers. A local Controller is required to follow any directions of the Group Controller.

The statutory responsibility for a declaration lies with the Mayor or the appointed representative. The decision to declare a state of emergency is usually based on the advice and judgement of the Civil Defence Emergency Management Officer and the Controller. Mayors and those appointed to make declarations are free to draw on the advice, experience and leadership of their senior executives.

The Controller is expected to manage the response while the Mayor, and if necessary, the Chair of the Regional Council, provide community leadership and assurance to the impacted community and key stakeholders such as Ministers and Members of Parliament.

There would be value in the Group conduct workshops for its Controllers to help clarify and differentiate the roles of the GECC and Group Controller with those of the local EOC and Local Controllers in a response that is managed at the local level, and in the situation when a regional response is required.

The Local Controller in Whakatane was very proactive and competent, and showed energy and commitment to the task. Given the circumstances experienced immediately after the breach of the stop bank at Edgecumbe early on 06 April, a declaration of a local state of emergency was appropriate. The rapidity in which the stop bank failed caught CDEM staff, response partners and the community by surprise, and was not adequately catered for in CDEM planning at either the regional or local levels. Nevertheless both levels adapted quickly to situation and the immediate response was effective. The declaration was kept in place until 11 April 2017 to enable a co-ordinated response to be made.

Given the impact on some communities by Cyclone Debbie a week earlier and with very wet ground and full catchments, it was concluded that the declaration of a state of emergency for the Bay of Plenty region in anticipation of Cyclone Cook was most appropriate in order to inform the public of the potential impact and encourage them to be prepared, to place responders at a heightened state of readiness and focussed on those areas considered by Group planning to be at most risk. A number of communities conducted voluntary evacuations on the advice of local CDEM or were subject to mandatory evacuations carried out by the Emergency Services.

### **Response Co-ordination**

The Group Emergency Co-ordination Centre (GECC) was initially activated in Tauranga but the Group Controller and key EMBOP staff deployed to Whakatane to advise and support the Local Controller and the Whakatane EOC. The GECC was set up in the WDC separate from, but adjacent to the EOC. The GECC supported the EOC well by co-ordinating the deployment of welfare agencies, and assisting the EOC find supplementary staff for critical functions, and bolstered the public information function.

CDEM response roles in the EOC are secondary functions for most council staff in the Group except for the CDEM staff controlled by EMBOP. The review cautions that the effectiveness of an EOC and the response can be compromised by poor selections, poor knowledge of CDEM and inadequate training.

### **Welfare**

The provision of welfare services and effective messages to the impacted community is critical to the success of a response. The review found that the welfare function in a future response would benefit from staff training on procedures and deeper planning for rapidly establishing Civil Defence Centres in communities.

### **Communications**

Communications to the community during the response were satisfactory, but the review questioned if the local levels can generate the capacity to provide messaging across all channels in a proactive and timely manner and the review recommends the Group find ways to add capacity and provide agility and a proactive approach to communicating critical information to the public.

### **Visit Co-ordination**

The task of co-ordinating visits to the district fell to the Public Information Management function and required them to manage itineraries as well provide situation updates and key messages. Visits like these are important both politically and to the communities impacted, but the effort required to arrange and co-ordinate them is considerable and can tax the PIM resources and divert them from their primary task. In large scale responses, it is recommended the Group provide additional resources separate from the PIM function.

### **Relationships**

The value of a trusted relationship between those involved in CDEM and partners and agencies that could be involved in a response cannot be overstated. The local deployment and the work undertaken by Police, Fire and Emergency service and local contractors and community organisations in the flooding response was outstanding, even if the suddenness of the breach and the urgency required caused some confusion over the control and direction of the response. Those who turned out to help the community showed no lack of willingness and initiative.

However the relationships with some partners supporting the Group would benefit from further development, most notably in the following areas:

- The Regional Council's Flood Management Team is a critical partner in the setting under review because of its role in warning communities and Controllers of threats and risks. Decisions made by Controllers call for accurate information gained from all sources and the use of judgement to manage risk. Regular contact between the Controller and the Flood Manager conveyed the situation as it developed.
- The CDEM relationship with iwi and marae should be enhanced to improve readiness and provide a conduit for information from communities to the EOC. The EMBOP Marae Preparedness Programme and the Community Response Planning process

should help consolidate CDEM activities in these communities to the point “of doing it with us, not having it done to us”.

- The Joint Committee should follow through on the decision made to co-opt to the CEG a suitable representative of Maori, which the Bay of Plenty Regional Council Komiti Maori is helping identify and select. The review was told Te Puni Kokiri will provide a senior advisor.
- The impact of the flooding on the rural sector should have resulted in considerable focus in the EOC on what was happening on farms and the implementation of plans to assist them in parallel with the evacuation of Edgecumbe and in addition to the welfare support that was well understood. Stronger relationships at the local and regional level with the primary sector or representatives should be forged to ensure the impact of an emergency on this sector is clear in an EOC and the GECC.
- The implementation of the Group’s successful programme of community based emergency response planning should be continued in order to engage more communities in CDEM, and help generate a better understanding of how CDEM can operate at the local level, which in turn will help make them more self-sufficient and promote a stronger link between their community and the Controller and the EOC.

### **Capacity and Capability**

The Group’s structures and arrangements for CDEM are sound and the response to the April flooding showed they can be effective. The capacity to manage a response depends on having the right number of people available for the key functions and having them trained in the procedures. Before the training can take place it would be important for the plans and processes to be reviewed to ensure they are relevant. Good structures and arrangements such as those in the Bay of Plenty need to be backed up with personnel who have the skills and knowledge and training using plans and procedures.

The Group needs to monitor the following:

- Key EOC personnel should be selected carefully for their attitude and commitment to the role and the ability to work under stress.
- Capacity in Planning, Logistics, Welfare and Public Information Management, which are all generally weak in CDEM. Without those functions staffed adequately, any response will be reactive rather than proactive and focus on the immediate rather than the longer term.
- EMBOP is unable to manage a response on its own. It relies on the participation of numerous partners and for their support to be effective, EMBOP and the Group have to foster the relationships and plan for their involvement.

Better CDEM in the Bay of Plenty region should involve more community response planning to improve connections between communities and the EOC, encourage local initiative and self-sufficiency and promote collaboration, co-ordination and standardisation in the management of emergencies.

## Recommendations

From the findings, the review recommends that the Bay of Plenty CDEM Group should:

1. Conduct workshops for members of the Joint Committee and CEG based on the arrangements provided in the legislation and the Group Plan to clarify their roles and responsibilities;
2. Require that the membership of the CEG be at the highest level to enhance management and development of CDEM in the region;
3. Introduce as common practice, CDEM staff informing CEG members of developing threats and the approach they intend for managing them;
4. Review the function of EMBOP to ensure the structure of civil defence emergency management in the region serves member councils and communities in a response and in the periods before and after a response;
5. Conduct workshops to clarify the functions and the relationship between the GECC and local EOCs and enhance understanding and procedures;
6. Amend the Group Plan to match the Group's policy for the cross-accreditation of Controllers from one local authority to others in the Group to provide additional capacity;
7. Provide regular refresher training for all Controllers;
8. Review its planning documents so that a series of river levels are identified to represent levels of risk to community safety and establish warning protocols for each river level;
9. Review the guidance for selecting Civil Defence Centres to be used in any given emergency event to ensure facilities are appropriate;
10. Selects sufficient suitable staff and volunteers in each district and trains them in both the EOC welfare function and the establishment and functioning of a Civil Defence Centre;
11. Ensure the PIM function has the capacity that enables it to provide proactive messages to the community using all the channels available;
12. Provide resources separate from the PIM function to manage a Visits Co-ordination function during a response; and
13. Implement greater engagement with communities, particularly Maori and rural, through the Marae Preparedness Programme and community emergency response planning.

## 1. Introduction

### 1.1 Background

- 1.1.1 During the period 03-13 April 2017 the Bay of Plenty faced two significant weather events. Ex-tropical cyclone Debbie affected the region during the period 03-07 April and was followed by ex-tropical cyclone Cook which passed over the region on 13 April. Ex-tropical cyclone Debbie dropped considerable rainfall over the entire region which produced record high river levels and flows in the Rangitaiki, Whakatane and Tauranga catchments. In the Rangitaiki flows reaching the Matahina Dam were 20% higher than ever recorded previously and flows in the Whakatane River were recorded as 34% higher than ever recorded.
- 1.1.2 The Whakatane District was impacted most significantly with flooding and landslides damaging and isolating smaller rural communities. The Whakatane River overtopped its banks south of the township flooding properties around Poroporo. On 06 April the Rangitaiki River breached the stop bank at Edgecumbe flooding a large part of the town damaging more than 290 dwellings and requiring more than 1600 residents to be evacuated. A local state of emergency was declared for the Whakatane District on 6 April. Other parts of the region were also impacted including flooding on the lower reaches of the Kaituna River and several landslides affecting properties in Ōmokoroa.
- 1.1.3 Tropical cyclone Cook was assessed to be a Category 3 cyclone as it crossed New Caledonia on 10 April. By 12 April Cook was re-classified as an ex-tropical cyclone and was forecast to pass over the Bay of Plenty region from the north on 13 April. It was expected to combine with a complex depression moving towards the North Island from the Tasman Sea and to produce heavy rain into the west and north of New Zealand during the period 11-12 April, and strong winds and swells from the north. However the depression in the Tasman Sea and its frontal bands stalled to the west of the North Island during 12 April but still produced a humid north-easterly flow and periods of rain onto the North Island. On 13 April ex-tropical cyclone Cook tracked south towards the Bay of Plenty. It crossed the coast between Te Puke and Whakatane on 13 April and continued south during that night producing strong winds and heavy rains.
- 1.1.4 A local state of emergency was declared for the entire Bay of Plenty region on 11 April in anticipation of the impact of ex-tropical cyclone Cook. Low lying coastal communities were evacuated in anticipation of the storm generating significant storm surges. Power cuts were widespread and many roads were cut off. Landslides in Omokoroa forced the evacuation of six properties. The region wide declaration was terminated on 14 April. And simultaneously a local state of emergency was re-declared for the Whakatane District to provide for ongoing response efforts in Edgecumbe. On 21 April the local state of emergency expired and was replaced by a Notice of Local Transition Period.

- 1.1.5 These were the first declared civil defence emergencies in the Bay of Plenty region since the Matata debris flow and Tauranga landslides in May 2005.

## **1.2 Review Objectives**

- 1.2.1 This report has been prepared in response to a request from the Bay of Plenty Civil Defence Emergency Management Group (CDEMG) to review the response by the Group to the April 2017 ex-tropical cyclones in order to identify opportunities for improvement, to confirm best practise, and to better understand the challenges faced by the Group. The review was intended to focus on the structural arrangements and the relationships and processes used for civil defence emergency management (CDEM) in the Bay of Plenty. A copy of the Project Brief shows the scope of the review project and is attached at Appendix 1.
- 1.2.2 When the review of the Group's response commenced there were three other reviews underway. The Whakatane District Council commissioned a review of its response to the flooding; the Bay of Plenty Regional Council commissioned Sir Michael Cullen to conduct an independent review of the infrastructure and the circumstances that led to the breach of the flood wall and the flooding of Edgecumbe on 06 April 2017; and a Ministerial Review of civil defence emergency management had been convened to consider the most appropriate operational and legislative mechanisms to support effective responses, although the latter review was not specifically related to the Bay of Plenty responses. There are some overlaps between the four reviews. At the beginning of the review of the Group's response it was agreed by Emergency Management Bay of Plenty (EMBOP) and the Whakatane District Council (WDC) that the WDC's review would be used to inform the Group review.

## **1.3 Approach Taken**

- 1.3.1 The approach used in the review of the CDEM Group response was to interview key personnel involved in CDEM in the region and in particular, those that played a role in the decision-making and response to the April cyclones and flooding. To minimise duplication, the Group review used material created by the review of the response by Whakatane District Council. A total of 21 people were interviewed during the week of 26 June (refer Appendix 2).
- 1.3.2 The review has looked at the statutory requirements and how the Group meets its obligations. It has assessed the practices used in managing the Group at the Joint Committee level and the Coordinating Executives Group and it has evaluated the arrangements for CDEM in the Bay of Plenty region including the structure and the Group Emergency Management Office (GEMO), the role and functioning of the Group Emergency Co-ordination Centre (ECC) and local Emergency Operations Centres (EOC). It has assessed the role of Controllers and the value of the relationships with partner agencies. The information gathered from the interviews and research was used to compare the current arrangements and functioning with legislated

requirements, guidance and best practice to identify those aspects that work well, as well as those aspects where it is judged improvements could be made.

## **1.4 Structure of Report**

- 1.4.1 The report is structured to provide an explanation of the legislative requirements and guidance that forms the framework for CDEM before amplifying the roles and responsibilities of the Joint Committee and the Coordinating Executive Group and their members in the non-response role and in response operations. It then applies the same approach to the place of the Group Plan as part of the legislative framework and then considers the structure and function of the Group office (Emergency Management Bay of Plenty) in developing and implementing the Group Plan. Essential elements of the Group's response arrangements are the Group Emergency Coordination Centre and local Emergency Operations Centres. The functional relationship between the Group and local centres is critical to not only meeting the intent of the legislation but also for an effective response. The review considers the arrangements for declaring states of emergency in the region and highlights the roles of the Group Controller and Local Controllers. Observations from the response to the flooding are used as indications of good practice and where improvements could be made.
- 1.4.2 The second part of the report considers how the Group's arrangements worked in the response to the April flooding, with particular attention paid to the flood warning process, the provision of welfare services and conveying information to the public, and the effectiveness of relationships with key partners in the response. The report suggests actions that could be used to enhance the Group's arrangements.
- 1.4.3 The report necessarily focusses on the arrangements at the regional level rather than the detail of the response at the tactical level. The review of the response by the Whakatane District Council covers the response in greater detail and should be read in conjunction with this report.
- 1.4.4 The specific issues listed in the scope section of the Project Brief are addressed throughout the report. Appendix 3 provides the cross references between the report and the issues listed in the project scope. Section 7 of the report summarises the recommendations made.

## 2. Civil Defence Emergency Management Arrangements in the Bay of Plenty

### 2.1 Meeting Legislative Requirements

- 2.1.1 CDEM in New Zealand is governed by a hierarchy of legislation, policy and guidance. The Civil Defence and Emergency Management Act 2002 (CDEM Act) is the legislation that provides the structural arrangements for CDEM. The National Strategy for CDEM provides the goals and objectives. The National CDEM Plan, in the form of a regulation, provides additional information on the arrangements and the roles and responsibilities in CDEM.
- 2.1.2 The CDEM legislation requires the Minister of Civil Defence to have a National Strategy for CDEM to state the Crown's goals, objectives and performance targets for CDEM. The National Strategy sets out the overall direction for CDEM in New Zealand and the national goal of generating a Resilient New Zealand, described as "communities that understand and manage their hazards". The strategy goes on to state that the approach to be used to generate resilient communities involves activities in risk reduction, readiness, response and recovery capabilities, commonly referred to as the four Rs. Importantly the CDEM Act (Section 17 a-k and Section 64) puts considerable responsibility for implementing the national strategy on local government and CDEM Groups. The CDEM Act also requires any actions taken by CDEM Groups not to be inconsistent with the national strategy (CDEM Act Section 37) which implies the Group's activities should be across the four Rs. The Group Plan indicates the Group's vision of a Resilient Bay of Plenty and the objectives for CDEM in the region are aligned with the national strategy.

### 2.2 Role of the Group

- 2.2.1 The CDEM Act (Section 12) requires local authorities and unitary authorities to form CDEM Groups. In the Bay of Plenty the Group comprises the Bay of Plenty Regional Council, Tauranga City Council, Western Bay of Plenty District Council, Whakatane District Council, Rotorua Lakes Council, Kawerau District Council, and the Opotiki District Council. This meets the requirement of the legislation.
- 2.2.2 The CDEM Act (Section 17 a-k) specifies the role of the CDEM Group. To provide for the governance of CDEM in the region, CDEM Groups use the mechanism of a Joint Committee. A Joint Committee is not defined in the CDEM legislation but it is a pragmatic way of providing governance and oversight of CDEM activities in the region including the capacity and capability to respond to local and regional emergencies. All members of the Group are expected to be represented on the Joint Committee and best practice would see the Mayors and the Chair of the Regional Council as members of the Joint Committee to provide leadership and to show commitment to the function and the statutory responsibilities provided in the legislation. However in the Bay of

Plenty Group, the Mayor of Tauranga has been appointed as Chair of the Joint Committee, which is appropriate given the commitments the Chair of the Regional Council has to other local government entities. The Regional Council is represented on the Joint Committee by a Councillor of the Regional Council. The formation and composition of the Joint Committee in the Bay of Plenty is in accordance with the legislation.

## **2.3 Role of Joint Committee**

- 2.3.1 The review was asked to consider the operational response role and the non-response role of the Joint Committee as a collective and the individual roles of Mayors and the Chair of the Regional Council in CDEM.
- 2.3.2 In the non-response setting, the primary function of the Joint Committee is to provide governance and leadership to the CDEM Group by providing the strategic direction for the Group and the oversight of the associated policies and planning for CDEM in the region. The Joint Committee is expected to ensure co-ordination occurs between members of the Group and supporting agencies, and is expected to monitor the state of CDEM in the region.
- 2.3.3 The risk for the development of CDEM in the Bay of Plenty region is that the Joint Committee meets its obligations but does not demonstrate commitment to enhance CDEM in the Bay of Plenty. But the Bay of Plenty is not alone in this challenge. Ideally, members of the Joint Committee are expected to be engaged in CDEM, to understand the arrangements and to champion CDEM by directing and monitoring activities that reduce risk, enhance readiness and improve response and recovery capabilities in the region and their districts. The Group Plan includes a work programme for CDEM, which was agreed by members. In addition the Group has an annual work programme as part of the Group's Annual Plan and progress reports are made to the Joint Committee. Most council Long Term Plans in the region provide for emergency management activities, which are aligned to the Group Plan. The challenge ahead of the Group is to improve governance of CDEM activities in the region, particularly in risk reduction and readiness.
- 2.3.4 In the operational response, the role of the Joint Committee as a whole, and of its individual members, changes. If the non-operational responsibilities of the Joint Committee have been discharged well, the Joint Committee should have confidence that the region and its communities are well prepared, the system has a high awareness of any developing threat, and the CDEM arrangements are sound, and the Group has the capability and capacity to respond in a timely and coordinated manner. Through the Group Plan process the Joint Committee and its individual members will have delegated the responsibility for controlling and co-ordinating the required response to a Controller. The Controller is expected to manage the response while the Mayor, and if necessary, the Chair of the Regional Council, provide community leadership and assurance to the impacted community and key stakeholders such as Ministers and Members of Parliament. Mayors and the Chair of the Joint Committee are responsible for making the declaration of a state of emergency should that be

necessary, based on the advice of their CDEM officials and arguably, taking into account the advice of their Chief Executives.

- 2.3.5 If the CDEM system is well organised, there is no need for elected officials to be directly involved in response operations. However, best practice suggests Mayors, councillors and council Chief Executives should be informed by their CDEM officials of any threats forming that could impact their communities, and during the response, they should be closely informed of progress, which informs the key messages they can relay to communities and stakeholders. It is perfectly acceptable for Mayors and the Chair to question the approach taken by the Controller to whom they have delegated the responsibility for managing the response, and to offer their suggestions, but the key role for the Mayor is leading the community and assuring stakeholders.
- 2.3.6 There is no prescription for how the Mayor might use councillors and other elected officials during a response. In a large scale response there would be considerable benefit if they were used as a conduit between the communities they represent and the Mayor and the Controller, and to convey messages back to the community in person and to help share the Mayor's community leadership task. In some cases (as occurred in the Whakatane district in April 2017) councillors might volunteer to serve in the response in some capacity. Ideally such volunteers would be aware of the CDEM arrangements and trained in the function they want to be involved in. But they need to also understand their voluntary actions are as a citizen and not as an elected official and to be aware that their involvement in the response could confuse lines of control and accountability.
- 2.3.7 It is recommended the Group conduct workshops for members of the Joint Committee and CEG based on the arrangements provided in the legislation and the Group Plan to clarify their roles and responsibilities.

## **2.4 Role of Co-ordinating Executive Group**

- 2.4.1 The review was asked to consider the role of the Co-ordinating Executive Group (CEG) outside a response and during a response operation. The legislation requires the Group to establish and maintain a CEG and the Bay of Plenty complies. A CEG is expected to comprise the Chief Executive (or a person acting for the CE) of each member council, senior representatives from the New Zealand Police, Fire and Emergency New Zealand, the hospital and health service, and any other persons that may be co-opted by the Group.
- 2.4.2 The role of the CEG is primarily outside any response and is to advise the Group (in essence the Joint Committee), implement decisions made by the Joint Committee, and oversee the development and implementation of CDEM plans for the region. Membership of the CEG at the most senior level demonstrates commitment to providing effective CDEM and brings decision-making authorities and leadership to CDEM. Not all Bay of Plenty CEG members are Chief Executives. For effectiveness and to show commitment, the Bay of Plenty CDEM Group should be looking to have CEG membership at the highest level.

- 2.4.3 It is recommended the Group require that the membership of the CEG be at the highest level to enhance management and development of CDEM in the region.
- 2.4.4 The Group can co-opt other representatives to the CEG. For example, representation from the lifeline utility sector on the CEG is considered valuable. The involvement of utilities is critical to forming the relationships at local and regional levels that help pre-event planning and importantly during a response, provide the linkage for passing information and co-ordinating response operations. The Bay of Plenty Lifelines Group is active and working well, but there is currently no Chair appointed. Instead, staff of EMBOP act as the liaison between the members of lifeline utilities group and the CEG and Group as a whole.
- 2.4.5 The CEG has no statutory role in a response and nor do council Chief Executives unless they are also Controllers. But the knowledge, experience and leadership of Chief Executives should be used to assist the management of the response through the provision of advice but without eroding the authority of the Controller (in a declared state of emergency). In some smaller councils the Chief Executives are also appointed Controllers. In a response many Chief Executives, who are not Controllers, prefer their role to be to guide and advise the Controller, support the Mayor and councillors, to maintain routine council functions as much as possible under the circumstances, and ensure the Controller has the support and council resources required for the response. Chief Executives taking this approach need to be mindful of the Controller's authority once a declaration has been made. The Chief Executive of the Whakatane District Council broadly applied this approach during the April 2017 flooding, with some success although some EOC staff found it difficult to relate to the direction of the Controller when the Chief Executive was also present. Such attitudes can be overcome by better explanations and training. There is little guidance to Chief Executives as to how they might balance their business as usual role and their interest in a response and it takes considerable judgement and trust in the Controller to find the right balance. In some circumstances the response to an emergency of the scale that requires a declaration of a local state of emergency suggests the response will take precedence over routine council business, and therefore the Chief Executive might choose to be very close to the Controller to advise and influence the response. In other circumstances, it will be appropriate for the Controller to use the delegation and take control of the response while the Chief Executive ensures support is available.
- 2.4.6 The statutory responsibility for a declaration lies with the Mayor or the appointed representative. The decision to declare a state of emergency is usually based on the advice and judgement of the Civil Defence Emergency Management Officer and the Controller. While the decision-making process in Whakatane in relation to the declaration was good, the current EMBOP arrangements dislocate the Emergency Management Officers from the Mayor, Chief Executive and Controller, which could impeded the discussion leading up to a decision to declare or not. Good practice suggests that the council's Chief Executive should also be informed of developing threats and the circumstances leading to the recommendation to declare. Mayors and those appointed to make declarations are free to draw on the advice, experience and leadership of their senior executives. The review does not expect the Group to

mandate a need to consult before a local declaration is made – that could slow the decision-making processes and undermine the authority delegated by the Group to Controllers and weaken the advisory role of EMBOP and Emergency Management Officers. But it should become common practice in the Group to inform council Chief Executives and CEG members of the developments and the proposed approach for dealing with it.

- 2.4.7 It is recommended the Group introduce as common practice, CDEM staff informing CEG members of developing threats and the approach they intend for managing them.

## 2.5 The Group Plan

- 2.5.1 Under the civil defence emergency management legislation CDEM Groups are required to have a Group Plan. The Act states the requirements of the plan (CDEM Act Section 48 and 49 (2)). The Bay of Plenty CDEM Group Plan 2012-2017 is assessed as meeting the statutory requirements. It lists the Group's goals in CDEM in very general terms and provides objectives in the four categories of risk reduction, readiness, response and recovery and contains in considerable detail the arrangements for CDEM in this region. The Plan is well written and provides ample explanation of the CDEM arrangements in the Bay of Plenty.
- 2.5.2 The extant 2012-17 Group Plan identifies the risks of flooding on the Rangitaiki and Whakatane Rivers and at Opotiki, as having its highest priority. In addition, the Plan sets one of the objectives in risk reduction as to “undertake long term, strategic reduction of risks from hazards through collaborative planning with CDEM stakeholders” (Section 3.4 Table 3). In 2014 the Group completed a new regional hazards assessment which saw a change in the priority for hazards. Tsunami, both local and distal, have the highest priority and while still in the high category, flooding has been allocated a lower priority. The Group chose not to amend the Group Plan at that time but to ensure the revised risks were incorporated in the draft Plan for the period 2017-22, which is currently out for public consultation. The 2012-17 Group Plan was in place at the time of the flooding. The weather forecast for the Bay of Plenty over the period 03-17 April 2017 suggested that flooding was likely and from a risk perspective, flooding had been assigned a high risk, but it was the rapidity in which the stopbank at Edgecumbe failed that caught CDEM staff, response partners and the community by surprise. That occurrence, resulting in a sudden onset of fast and deep flooding to the township of Edgecumbe, which was not adequately catered for in CDEM planning at either the regional or local levels.
- 2.5.3 In the readiness category, the objectives include to “ensure that political/senior executive level development needs are included in the annual BOP CDEM Professional Development Plan and politicians/senior executives champion the delivery of the BOP CDEM Group Plan” (Section 4.4 Table 4). From comments made to the review and to the Ministerial Review, it would appear this objective has not been implemented adequately.

- 2.5.4 In the response section, the Plan provides an explanation of roles and functions of agencies involved. It states the primary response role for each territorial authority as being to plan and provide for CDEM in its district and to co-ordinate and control the response at the local level. The primary response role of Emergency Management Bay of Plenty (EMBOP), which is also referred to as the Group Office, is stated as co-ordinating and facilitating the day to day planning and project work on behalf of the Group to ensure the Group is able to respond effectively to any emergency event; and, to support the Group Emergency Co-ordination Centre (GECC) in responding to emergency events (Section 5.3.1 Table 5).
- 2.5.5 The Group Plan explains the differentiation between the roles of the Local Controller and the Emergency Operations Centre (EOC), and the Group Controller and the GECC, as well as the National Controller and the National Crisis Management Centre (NCMC) (Section 5.4.3 Figure 2). The Plan indicates how the Group intends to manage differing scales of emergency by adjusting the roles of local EOCs, the GECC and Controllers as the scale of the impact changes. Using Table 7 of the Group Plan, the Edgecumbe flooding of 06 April would have been managed as a Level 3 response, with a state of local emergency declared and the local EOC (in Whakatane) activated to control and coordinate the response through the Local Controller. The Group ECC would have been activated in support of the Whakatane EOC and the Group Controller would be supporting the Local Controller. The arrangements put in place to manage the April flooding by the Whakatane District Council and EMBOP were in accordance with the Group Plan, but despite the good explanations provided by the Group Plan, the understanding of the arrangements by some members of the Joint Committee and CEG was inadequate.
- 2.5.6 The Group Plan also makes provision for the situation anticipated by the Group as ex-tropical cyclone Cook moved towards the region on 12 April. According to the Plan it would have required a Level 4 response as Cook was forecast to be a significant event that was likely to have an impact across the region. A declaration was made for the region, local EOCs were activated in other districts as a precaution, the Group ECC was activated, areas assessed as most likely to be impacted were warned, and the Group Controller was expected to coordinate any response if one was required. The National Crisis Management Centre (NCMC) was activated in support of Bay of Plenty and other CDEM Groups that were thought could be impacted by the storm. Again, the actions taken by the Group were in accordance with the Group Plan, and appropriate for the circumstances.

## 2.6 Emergency Management Bay of Plenty

- 2.6.1 The Bay of Plenty CDEM Group is structured to provide a centralised office for the Group (the Group Emergency Management Office (GEMO)), which since 2015 has been referred to as Emergency Management Bay of Plenty (EMBOP). The Group Plan (8.4.3) explains the role and responsibility of EMBOP and the GEMO. In general terms it provides the co-ordination for CDEM activities in the region.

- 2.6.2 In accordance with legislation, the Bay of Plenty Regional Council is the administering authority for the GEMO, which means the Regional Council provides administrative support including HR and employment support, secretarial services, and financial management support for the Group. The Regional Council per se has no line authority over the work of the GEMO – it provides a home for the office and the administrative support. It is the Joint Committee, supported by the CEG, which is responsible for CDEM in the region and therefore has the responsibility for the functioning of EMBOP and the GEMO. The Regional Council's Chief Executive understands the role of the administering authority well. But the review found that the structure and functioning of the GEMO and EMBOP is not well understood across the Group. As one example, the review was told the Regional Council's Komiti Maori has at times attempted to direct EMBOP's work when that is the responsibility of the Joint Committee. While the poor understanding of the purpose of EMBOP did not impact directly on the response to the flooding, it is symptomatic of a lack of understanding of the arrangements.
- 2.6.3 When EMBOP was established, the Joint Committee agreed the Director of EMBOP would direct and task the routine work of all the Emergency Management Advisers in the Group, through an agreed work programme and budget, while enabling the Advisers to maintain close association with Councils and their staff for implementation of CDEM activities. The Group Plan provides the explanations and the Joint Committee and CEG were involved in its development and approval. The risk with the centralised model as used by the Group for EMBOP is that it can be seen by the territorial authorities as being too centralised, which risks the model being perceived as EMBOP having the responsibility to provide CDEM and not the councils; that the councils have lost their Adviser and their autonomy; the distance between the Adviser and the council is increased and the connection weakened; and worse (as it is outside the legislation), the Regional Council is perceived as responsible for CDEM.
- 2.6.4 The previous model allowed individual councils to determine the scale of their participation in CDEM. Invariably smaller councils struggled to provide even one fulltime Adviser. A GEMO was still maintained but it tended to focus on administering CEG and Joint Committee meetings and monitoring and supporting councils' efforts. The intent behind the centralised model was to pool CDEM resources from across the region and have routine work controlled (or tasked) by the Director to work across all of the four Rs in every council's area. This should have allowed the local experience and connections of the local Adviser to be supplemented by additional expertise and knowledge available from the pool. For example, in public education and awareness, it is inconceivable in large regions, such as the Bay of Plenty, that each council could provide for the skills required to deliver an effective programme. Instead the resource could be accessed from EMBOP and the same approach can be adopted for activities like developing a community response planning process, or training Controllers, Welfare Managers and PIM.
- 2.6.5 The key to making the centralised approach work lies in understanding the model and having an agreed work programme (as a function of CEG and the Joint Committee) which would allow each council to specify what it wants to have done in its district. The programme would give the Director EMBOP and the staff a plan to implement and

something they would be assessed against. Effective governance by the Joint Committee would include monitoring progress in the work programme and helping to set priorities and resolve issues.

- 2.6.6 It is recommended that the Group review the function of EMBOP to ensure the structure of civil defence emergency management in the region serves member councils and communities in a response and in the periods before and after a response.

## **2.7 Group Emergency Co-ordination Centre and Emergency Operations Centre**

- 2.7.1 The arrangements and guidance provided to CDEM Groups and by the Group Plan allows for the initial response to an emergency to be made by the territorial authority using all the resources it has on hand. If the situation is beyond the capability of the council and its resources, or more than one council is involved in the emergency, the control and co-ordination of the response can be escalated to the regional level. The Group Plan provides for EMBOP to monitor the response being made at the local level and to support the local response by arranging for additional regional resources to be deployed to the impacted area and maintaining liaison with MCDEM. This procedure worked well during the flooding response. In the most extreme events, when the scale and complexity of the response warrants, the legislation allows for the government to centralise the control and co-ordination of the response in the appointment of the National Controller. The first and only time the National Controller has been used was for the response to the 2011 Christchurch earthquake. EMBOP understands these arrangements well, and as was seen in April 2017, is prepared to use them if required.
- 2.7.2 The guidance to CDEM Groups and the Group Plan expects individual Councils to be able to provide and run a local Emergency Operations Centre (EOC) to control and coordinate a response at the local level. Similarly the Group is expected to provide staff to and operate a Group Emergency Coordination Centre (GECC) from which the Group Controller can support a Local Controller and EOC, and if necessary when responding to a large scale event impacting more than one council, control and coordinate the response across the region.
- 2.7.3 The Whakatane EOC functioned well during the April flooding although as discussed later, capacity and training has been identified as aspects that should be improved. The GECC was initially activated in Tauranga prior to the flooding in Whakatane, and the Director/Group Controller and some key EMBOP staff were deployed to Whakatane and were at the EOC to advise and support the Local Controller as expected by the Group Plan. The GECC was relocated to the WDC offices, operating separately but adjacent to the EOC. In addition to advice, the Group Controller and GECC arranged for supplementary staff to the EOC from other Groups and kept MCDEM and the NCMC informed. Welfare agencies not available in Whakatane were notified by the Group Welfare Manager to support service delivery in the district, which is consistent with the role of the Group Welfare Manager. Some Whakatane District Council staff in the EOC were unclear of how the roles of the EOC and GECC were

differentiated, and this was exacerbated further by the Group Welfare Manager also taking on the role of WDC Welfare Manager. For gaining supplementary staff, the Group maintains a reciprocal agreement with the Waikato and Auckland CDEM Groups. This arrangement was used during the response but there was some duplication and confusion as to which level was responsible for arranging extra staff. The Plan suggests appropriately that it is the GECC's role to co-ordinate support.

- 2.7.4 As is the case with many CDEM Groups, there remains a question about the ability of the Group to staff local EOCs and the GECC simultaneously as would be required in a regional emergency. In this response additional staff were bought in to staff both levels which indicates capacity is limited. But having said that, not all members of the Group assisted the GECC or the Whakatane EOC. Perhaps staff could not be released from their routine work, or there were insufficient with the required skills. Perhaps there was more focus on business-as-usual tasks than the need to support the response to an emergency. The review does not advocate identifying and training the full complement required, let alone allow for sustainment over a long period - few CDEM Groups can or do. The primary focus within the Group should be on ensuring councils can operate their own EOCs with the right people with the right training and ensuring that when the EOC is activated, the Controller is well supported by managers and staff, and that the EOC's functioning is not compromised by council managers withdrawing staff to tasks not related to the emergency. Once staffing for council EOCs is more assured, the Group could consider what is required in the event of a wider regional response. Inevitably the activation of the GECC will require supplementing from other CDEM Groups and particularly by them providing leaders for the key functions of planning, logistics, and PIM. Leadership from these appointees will be critical as they will have to direct and closely monitor and tutor new staff and volunteers as was done in Christchurch in 2011. In the meantime the priority should be on selecting and training staff for each of the EOCs for a minimum of two shifts. Even that task will tax available resources.
- 2.7.5 It is recommended the Group conduct workshops to clarify the functions and the relationship between the GECC and local EOCs and enhance understanding and procedures.
- 2.7.6 Once the declaration of a state of emergency for the Bay of Plenty region was made on 13 April in anticipation of the impact of Cyclone Cook, the GECC was prepared to activate in its control and co-ordination role rather than in its support role. That preparation was prudent and appropriate. The full functioning of the GECC has not been tested in a real event, and particularly when a number of EOCs are in operation. It is recommended the relationship between the GECC and local EOCs be workshopped to enhance understanding and procedures and help formulate an approach to add capacity.

## 2.8 Declarations

- 2.8.1 The CDEM Act requires the Group to appoint persons who may declare a state of local emergency. In the Bay of Plenty, the Group Plan grants the authority to declare a state

of local emergency for a regional emergency (often referred to as a regional declaration) to the Chairperson of the Joint Committee, the Deputy Chairperson of the Joint Committee and any member of the Joint Committee, in a descending order. The Group Plan appoints Mayors and Deputy Mayors to declare a state of emergency for all or part of their areas.

- 2.8.2 Emergencies can be caused by a range of occurrences, natural and otherwise which could cause loss of life, injury distress or endangers safety of the public or property, and cannot be dealt with by the emergency services, or requires a significant and coordinated response. The legislation states a declaration of a state of local emergency may be made when an emergency has occurred or may occur within that area. Additional guidance provided by the Director of the Ministry of Civil Defence & Emergency Management to CDEM Groups is that the primary consideration for declaring is whether the special powers provided by the Act under a state of emergency are required or deemed to be required to best manage the emergency. The Director's guidance also provides additional conditions to guide when a declaration should be made. A declaration could be made when the situation meets the Act's interpretation of an emergency, the council's ability to manage the response particularly with respect to utilities and social services is compromised, additional powers are required, and where a declaration adds value to the response. The normal process through which a state of emergency is declared could be expected to involve the appointed representative being advised by staff, which could include the Local Emergency Management Officer or the Chief Executive or the Director of EMBOP, of the circumstances faced and why a declaration is required. With the EM Advisers based centrally at EMBOP (apart from Rotorua) immediate access to their advice and assistance might be difficult.
- 2.8.3 Given the circumstances experienced immediately after the breach of the stop bank at Edgecumbe early on 06 April, a declaration of a local state of emergency was appropriate. The declaration was kept in place until 11 April to enable a co-ordinated response to be made. The review of the Whakatane response concluded that the declaration was not only appropriate but that it was made in a timely manner.
- 2.8.4 Making a declaration ahead of an emergency occurring, as was done by the Chair of the Group on 11 April 2017 for the whole Bay of Plenty region, is unusual but is in accordance with the legislation and guidance. The forecasts available in the period leading up to 11 April indicated not only the path of Cook through the region but also the likelihood of heavy rain and strong winds to impact the region and storm surges to hit coastal communities. Given the impact on some communities by Cyclone Debbie a week earlier and with very wet ground and full catchments, it was concluded that the declaration of a state of emergency for the Bay of Plenty region was most appropriate in order to inform the public of the potential impact and encourage them to be prepared, and to place responders at a heightened state of readiness and focussed on those areas considered by Group planning to be at most risk. A number of communities conducted voluntary evacuations on the advice of local CDEM or were subject to mandatory evacuations carried out by the Emergency Services. As it turned out the weather produced by Cook in the Bay of Plenty was not as bad as had been

anticipated. However, with the forecasts at the time and knowledge of the conditions in the region, making the declaration was prudent. The local state of emergency declared for the region ended on 14 April and the Mayor of Whakatane then made another declaration for the district for the period 14-21 April to enable the continued response to Edgecumbe and surrounding areas.

## 2.9 Controllers

- 2.9.1 A declaration of a local state of emergency grants emergency powers to the CDEM Group, which are exercised through the Controller. The Group is required to appoint a Group Controller and alternatives, and the Group may also choose to appoint Local Controllers for specified areas. The Local Controller is required to follow the directions of the Group Controller. The Bay of Plenty CDEM Group meets best practice by having the Joint Committee appoint a Group Controller and alternatives for the region, as well as Local Controllers and alternatives for each of the territorial authorities. Furthermore, the Group should be praised for agreeing during the Whakatane response to the cross-accreditation of Controllers from other territorial authorities to the Whakatane District Council to provide additional capacity. While the Group policy for Controllers has been amended the arrangement should be also formalised in the Group Plan.
- 2.9.2 It is recommended the Group amends the Group Plan to match the Group's policy for the cross-accreditation of Controllers from one local authority to others in the Group to provide additional capacity.
- 2.9.3 The Local Controller's primary role is to control and co-ordinate the local response using the co-ordination and planning mechanisms provided by the EOC. It is important to note that Controllers have no authority to apply emergency powers outside a declared state of emergency but it is a common and appropriate practice for Local Controllers to manage a local response to an emergency before a state of emergency is declared. Should a state of emergency be declared, the Local Controller can access the extraordinary powers if needed.
- 2.9.4 When a local response is initiated, the role of the Group Controller is to monitor and support the Local Controller, and to co-ordinate support from across the region for employment by the Local Controller in the area impacted. If the situation escalates to require a region wide declaration (say through more than one territorial local authority being impacted), the Group Controller can assume responsibility for controlling and co-ordinating response activities across the whole region, including prioritising efforts, using the facilities of the GECC. But importantly, the Group Controller directs and controls the operations managed by subordinate Local Controllers. Under a Group declaration, local operations cannot be independent of the Group Controller's plan.
- 2.9.5 In the Bay of Plenty Group in April 2017 the declaration of a Group wide state of emergency did not result in operational activities that required the Group Controller to allocate resources or co-ordinate a response. It was preparatory and based on some sound planning. Group-wide declarations are rare events. The most recent was by

the Canterbury CDEM Group following the November 2016 North Canterbury earthquakes, when Hurunui and Kaikoura districts were impacted and there was a need to closely co-ordinate response activities and allocate scarce resources. The Bay of Plenty Group is very familiar with the arrangements for managing a local response. But since Group-wide declarations and response activities are rare events, there would be considerable value in workshopping how the arrangements and co-ordination between the regional level and local levels would operate.

- 2.9.6 The members of the Group are responsible for selecting and proposing their controllers for approval by the Joint Committee. The Whakatane District Council's Controller did a highly competent job managing the response, but the review found there was some isolated disquiet around the appointment of Controllers, which indicates the process of selection and appointment was not well understood. The Group's policy document for the appointment and development of controllers lists the attributes required in the effective Controller. With an understanding of the role of the Controller and the likely events he/she could be involved in, and the depth of community and general leadership experience available in the Group, developing selection criteria is straightforward. The attributes required include local knowledge, leadership, forward planning, relationship building, communication skills and personal resilience, energy and commitment. In selecting Controllers, there is a risk that placing a low priority on CDEM generally can result in Local Controllers being chosen from lower levels of the council staffing (perhaps because the likelihood of their availability for a response function is higher). This could result in less than adequate knowledge and attributes than required for the effective management of the response. It is also important to acknowledge that with the appointment to the position of Controller comes the delegated responsibility for managing the response.
- 2.9.6 It is recommended the Group provide regular refresher training for all Controllers.
- 2.9.7 The Whakatane District Council's Controllers and the alternates performed very well during the flooding response, and the control and co-ordination of the response to both ex-tropical cyclones in April 2017 were good. The Controllers seemed to have a good understanding of the role and the boundaries. The challenge for the Group is to ensure Controllers receive the continuation training necessary to give them the confidence and capability to undertake this critical leadership role. Any weakness in understanding or familiarity, around how CDEM is expected to be provided to communities, or in the interpretation of the roles of the local EOCs, the regional GECC, and the roles of Local Controllers and the Group Controller, or hesitation in decision-making will be translated into a poor response. The Group has access to ample guidance and explanations, and information that needs to be used to provide regular refresher training to ensure familiarity, alignment and competency.

## 3. Response Co-ordination

### 3.1 Flood Warnings

- 3.1.1 The review was told of the role of the Regional Council's Flood Team and the relationship between the team and CDEM staff of the GEMO, and between the team and District Councils and the residents likely to be impacted. That relationship was described as good. Given the risk of flooding in the region, the relationship between the Flood Team and CDEM staff has to be highly collaborative and proactive in sharing information to ensure the knowledge and data held by the Flood Team informs CDEM of threats, and influences their decisions on issuing warnings and in the worst case, ordering evacuations.
- 3.1.2 The Regional Council Flood Team produced its first Sitrep at 1700hrs on Tuesday 04 April 2017 by which stage the flood room had been fully activated and was operating 24/7. The first published Sitrep indicated river systems would rise overnight and continue to rise for the next two days, predicting the Whakatane River would reach its first warning level at 0900hrs on Wednesday 05 April, the Waioeka at 0100hrs Wednesday and the Otara River at 1230hrs Wednesday 05 April. The Rangitaiki River was not covered in that report. The second Sitrep was issued next morning on Wednesday at 0700hrs and predicted river flows would peak during Thursday morning and second warnings would be issued for all rivers during that day. Early on the morning of Thursday 06 April, Sitrep 5 was issued at 0130hrs signalling the Whakatāne and Rangitāiki Rivers were both likely to reach record levels. It showed a second warning had been issued for the Whakatane River and the first warning was still in place for the Rangitaiki River. It indicated the Matahina Dam was spilling water to manage the peak and the floodway was expected to be operating from around 0400hrs. A new Sitrep was published at 0630hrs on Thursday 06 April, which indicated peak flows into the Matahina dam were expected at midday and the Whakatane and Rangitaiki Rivers would reach record levels. The Sitrep reported staff would monitor stopbanks on both sides and the Reids Central spillway but the warning for the Rangitaiki remained at the first level. Sitrep 7 was issued at 1100hrs on Thursday 06 April after the breach at Edgecumbe. It reports the breach occurred at 0900hrs and that residents were being evacuated from Edgecumbe and Kokohinau Bend.
- 3.1.3 During the time leading up to the evacuation of Edgecumbe, there were regular telephone conversations between the Flood Team and the Group and local Controllers. The review was unable to confirm the content of the conversations that took place, but in these situations three factors are critical to the effective management of the risk. There has to be a strong and trusting relationship between those providing flood forecasts and those with the responsibility to respond to the threat, the CDEM Controllers. In this case that relationship was strong and well-practised. Second, the information conveyed from the Flood Team (or in other settings, by the MetService, GNS or geotechnical engineers) has to be in a form that helps Controllers apply their

judgement in deciding actions that should be taken given the risk presented. Communicating risk is a critical and sometimes difficult task and the tone and language used in the information flows are important. The review is concerned about how risk was communicated and interpreted in this case. Perhaps there is scope for the flood reports (particularly in messages to the public) to use river levels and a system of grades or colour codes to indicate escalating risks in much the same way that weather forecasts now use terms such as watch and warning for severe weather.

- 3.1.4 It is recommended that the Group reviews its planning documents so that a series of river levels are identified to represent levels of risk to community safety and establish warning protocols for each river level.

## 3.2 Welfare Services

- 3.2.1 The delivery of effective welfare services to communities impacted by an emergency is critical to any response. To help organise, co-ordinate, train and deliver welfare services in a response, CDEM Groups form Welfare Co-ordination Groups (WCG). While not required by the legislation, the National CDEM Plan expects the WCG at the regional level to be the vehicle for co-ordinating plans, forming relationships and making arrangements for the delivery of welfare services in a response. In the Bay of Plenty EMBOP provides a Group Welfare Manager who chairs the WCG and is responsible for overseeing the planning and coordination of CDEM welfare services in the region, and in a local response, is responsible for coordinating welfare resources for use by the local welfare team. At the local level a Welfare Manager is expected to be appointed to lead the welfare function controlled and coordinated by the Local Controller through the EOC and delivered to the impacted community. In essence welfare services are coordinated at the regional level and delivered locally. The WCG is expected to report its readiness to the CEG.
- 3.2.2 Members of WCG in BOP include Police, BOP District Health Board, Lakes District Health Board, Ministry of Vulnerable Children Oranga Tamariki, MBIE, MPI (to represent animal welfare and the primary sector), local Welfare Committee Chairs (currently covered by an EMBOP staff member) and the MCDEM Regional Emergency Management Adviser.
- 3.2.3 The local EOC-led welfare team is expected to plan for how the welfare services required to support the impacted communities are employed. This could include the establishment of Civil Defence Centres, the provision of support from agencies such as MSD and WINZ, the Ministry of Vulnerable Children Oranga Tamariki, Red Cross, Victim Support and others as required by circumstances. In the response to the flooding in the Whakatane district, Civil Defence Centres were established at the Rautahi marae in Kawerau and the Whakatane War Memorial Hall. Support from members of the WCG was excellent. Nevertheless the response highlights a number of issues in the provision of welfare services that should be improved:
- The two Whakatane District Council staff assigned to the role of Welfare Manager in the EOC were both unavailable at the time of the activation. The Group Welfare Manager deployed to Whakatane to initially act as the Group's co-ordinator and

then became the local Welfare Manager. Holding two appointments at the same time caused some confusion for EOC staff. However the experience of the Group Welfare Manager and her connections to other welfare agencies and her recent experience in a number of other responses to emergencies across New Zealand helped produce good results for the community.

- Staff assigned to the welfare function in the Whakatane EOC were initially too few in number for the scale of the impact. Additional staff were bought in but many needed some training. Had the Group Welfare Manager not been deployed it is assessed the service provided is likely to have suffered.
- Having selected locations for Civil Defence Centres, there was inadequate experience, planning and guidance available to set-up and get them operating quickly.

3.2.4 In many responses, the community's judgement of the success of the response depends heavily on their experience in gaining information and services and particularly those related to welfare. The success of the delivery of welfare services relies heavily on the personal attributes of staff appointed to this function in the EOC (and others), and their ability to attend training. It is assessed that welfare support was delivered effectively in the April response, although the start of the welfare operation was hampered by inadequate prior training and planning and a slow response. The efforts of welfare agencies involved in Whakatane are to be commended.

3.2.5 Given the importance of welfare to the community hit by an emergency, it is recommended the Group review the guidance for selecting Civil Defence Centres to be used in any given emergency event to ensure facilities are appropriate; and, that it selects sufficient suitable staff and volunteers in each district and trains them in both the EOC welfare function and the establishment and functioning of a Civil Defence Centre.

### 3.3 Public Information Management (PIM)

3.3.1 Providing communities with information during an emergency is critical to the success of the response. Impacted communities need to understand the situation confronting them and to receive timely guidance on what they should do to cope with the emergency. Both the ECC and EOC structures include the PIM function, which is intended to develop and manage messages to the community and the media covering their areas of responsibility. To be effective, the PIM function in a response has to have the capacity and capability to use all channels available. Concentrating on the traditional channels through media releases and radio and television interviews is no longer likely to meet the public's expectations for near continuous, accurate information going out from the EOC and an ability for impacted communities to pass information in. Social media channels now play a critical role.

3.3.2 The Whakatane EOC drew on the experience of the council's Public Affairs Manager to lead the PIM team. The rapidly changing tempo of the response, from a local watch to a declared state of emergency, to a region-wide declaration and back to a local emergency, taxed the resources available. The regional PIM function, led by the

Group PIM, also struggled for resource until additional capacity from outside the region was provided to the Whakatane EOC.

- 3.3.3 Rapidly changing situations in a response like that in April 2017, and the demand for near-real time information, call for considerable agility in the PIM team to maintain information flows and provide assurance. These conditions call for less rigid control and checking of the details of the messages, and a much broader direction and trust from the Controller and in turn, strong connections between PIM and other EOC functions to best understand the situation and the response direction. Information gained by PIM from social media interactions should be passed quickly to the Intelligence section.
- 3.3.4 The review was concerned that the capacity of the PIM function may have only just kept them up with the demand for information, when keeping ahead of the media is critical to success and the public's confidence in the response. The review concludes the PIM function needs not just the capacity and ability to monitor and manage all the channels, but to be more agile and proactive.
- 3.3.5 It is recommended the Group review its PIM capacity and its approach to the function with a view to ensuring the Group has the ability to use all the channels available in a proactive manner.
- 3.3.6 Finding the additional capacity will probably require some innovation. The Group could consider using communications staff from large commercial organisations in the region to assist. The Group might find there is a local pool of social media savvy players, who under the leadership and direction of the public information manager in the EOC, could be used to meet the demand for information to be distributed through that channel. In both cases the PIM function would need to adjust its approach and provide leadership and direction to a much larger and different team than has been used in the past.
- 3.3.7 During the flooding response there were a number of visits to the impacted area by senior politicians including the Prime Minister, the Minister of Civil Defence and local Members of Parliament. The task of co-ordinating these visits fell to the PIM function and included them providing situation updates and key messages as well as managing itineraries. Visits like these are important both politically and to the communities impacted, but the effort required to arrange and coordinate them is considerable and can tax the PIM resources and divert them from their primary task.
- 3.3.8 In large scale responses, it is recommended the Group provide additional resources, separate from the PIM function, perhaps from those trained in events management, to manage a Visits Co-ordination function during a response.

### 3.4 Engagement with Response Partners

- 3.4.1 The National Civil Defence Emergency Management Plan directs the roles of agencies supporting any response. Those roles have been consulted and agreed at the national level based on experiences during the 2011 Christchurch earthquake. The National Plan has the status of a regulation, which implies there is no scope for an agency to not provide the support intended. The challenge for members of the Group is to first, understand the roles provided for in the National Plan; second, engage and consult with the partners identified in the Plan to organise how that support and the services are to be delivered in a response, and third, design how the support is to be co-ordinated at the Group/GECC level and controlled and tasked by the local EOC for delivery to impacted communities.
- 3.4.2 The April 2017 response showed that the local deployment and the work undertaken by Police, Fire and Emergency service and local contractors and community organisations was outstanding, even if the suddenness of the breach and the urgency required caused some confusion over the control and direction of the response. Those that turned out to help the community showed no lack of willingness and initiative.
- 3.4.3 The response showed that greater engagement by the Group with Maori communities and the primary sector could enhance CDEM. From the Group Plan, 26% of the region's population identify as Maori and the region has some remote rural communities with limited and vulnerable infrastructure that are likely to become isolated in an emergency. The Plan states it is vital that preparedness is promoted in these communities. The Group's Marae Preparedness Programme was intended to have Group staff engage with marae to enhance preparedness and discuss the role of marae in emergencies, including using some of them as Civil Defence Centres if that was agreed by the marae. The review was told the programme has made slow progress. A second initiative was the April 2016 resolution by the Joint Committee to co-opt to the CEG a suitable representative of Maori, which the Bay of Plenty Regional Council Komiti Maori would help identify and select. The review was told Te Puni Kokiri will provide a senior advisor to the CEG. Together these initiatives should help the Group develop closer involvement of Maori communities in CDEM not only in readiness but critically, in response to emergencies such as the April 2017 flooding, through communities providing information to the EOC which will improve situational awareness and encourage a more accurate response to those impacted.
- 3.4.4 The review suggests a similar situation has developed with respect to the connection and involvement of the primary sector in CDEM. During the April flooding, farmers connected to the river warning system were appropriately warned by the Flood Team. Farmers needing assistance relied on their own initiative, neighbours and their rural suppliers (primarily Fonterra for dairy and Zespri for kiwifruit). The Rural Support Trust was also active in the region and worked with the Whakatane EOC's Welfare Manager to coordinate welfare support. But the impact of the flooding on the rural sector should have resulted in considerable focus in the EOC on what was happening on farms and the implementation of plans to assist them in parallel with the evacuation of

Edgecumbe. The engagement between CDEM and the EOC and the rural sector appeared to be weak.

- 3.4.5 CDEM in New Zealand is based on communities being ready and able to make the initial response to an emergency without waiting for something official. For this approach to be effective, the community needs to be aware of how they are going to respond using local resources; they need to know the boundaries of their authorities for their response; they need to know how to transmit progress with their response initiatives to the Controller and the EOC; and in the event the scale of the response required exceeds local capacities, they need to know how to seek assistance from the Controller. The challenge for CDEM is get the community engaged and encouraged to do more themselves. Dividing districts into natural zones, which are often based on lines of communication, can help with engagement and the design of community based response arrangements. But each zone needs to be supported with guidance and an effective means of communicating with the EOC. Continuation of the implementation of the Group's successful programme of community based emergency response planning is recommended in order to engage more communities in CDEM, and help generate a better understanding of how CDEM at the local level can operate. This will in turn encourage them to undertake community planning that will help make them more self-sufficient and promote a stronger link between their community and the Controller and the EOC.
- 3.4.6 It is recommended the Group implement greater engagement with communities, particularly Maori and rural, through the Marae Preparedness Programme and community emergency response planning.

## 4. Support from MCDEM and the NCMC

- 4.1 The National Crisis Management Centre was activated by the Ministry on Tuesday 04 April in its monitoring mode as MCDEM became aware of heavy rain and rising river levels in Taranaki and Whanganui. Initially there were no significant issues in either of those areas until the Mayor of Whanganui declared a state of local emergency late Tuesday evening to prepare for evacuation in areas of Whanganui. By early Thursday 06 April the NCMC was beginning to wind down when they were informed that in the Bay of Plenty evacuation had started in Edgecumbe, followed rapidly by the declaration after the stopbank had been breached. The NCMC then refocussed its attention to that area and MCDEM proactively deployed four staff to Whakatane to provide three Regional Emergency Management Advisers (REMAs) to support the Controller, the Chief Executive and Mayor, and recovery planning. The fourth MCDEM member was deployed to support the welfare function.
- 4.2 The NCMC accomplished two main functions during the response. It kept the Minister and partner agencies informed of developments in the region and worked to find and co-ordinate provision of supplementary staff to the Group. But the NCMC's task was complicated by the Bay of Plenty CDEM Group's use of the mutual assistance agreement between it and the Waikato and Auckland CDEM Groups first, which caused some duplication of requests made to the NCMC. The NCMC then assisted the Bay of Plenty Group by finding the support required that was beyond the scope of the alliance.
- 4.3 The support provided by the Ministry and the NCMC to the Bay of Plenty was in accordance with the Guide to the National CDEM plan. The NCMC was in the 'Engage' mode (Mode 2), and was able to assist the Group to find supplementary staff. The normal process would be for the EOC's logistics function to ask the GECC to find resources that are not available locally. The GECC would be expected to marshal additional resources from within the Group first, then look to its neighbouring Groups and then ask the NCMC to assist.
- 4.4 The NCMC's interpretation of the forecast for ex-tropical cyclone Cook was for Northland, Auckland, Waikato (Coromandel Peninsula) and the Bay of Plenty to be impacted significantly. In preparation, the NCMC arranged for extra NCMC staff from partner agencies in Wellington to be available should they have to activate to assist over a longer period. As it turned out full activation did not take place and the extra staff were not required.

## 5. A Way Ahead

- 5.1 The arrangements for CDEM in the Bay of Plenty are in accordance with the legislation and various plans and guidelines provided from the national level. The Group's Plan is comprehensive and provides good explanation of how the arrangements are intended to function in the region. The legislative provisions do not hinder a response, and if applied appropriately will enable an effective response. The response to the April flooding in the Whakatane District indicates the framework in the Bay of Plenty is sound. The challenge for this Group (and many others) is to establish a solid understanding amongst the key participants of how the arrangements are expected to operate, to ensure the plans and procedures are comprehensive and up to date, to ensure the appropriate number of staff are available and to train them to the required standard, and lastly, during a response ensure they operate the way the structure is intended. Clearly checking that the system is functional and ready is no small task. The reviewer is of the opinion that areas for improvement can be identified as distinct parcels and placed in a sequence.
- 5.2 The areas the review identified for improvement can be broken into familiarisation and better understanding of the arrangements (largely aimed at personnel at the senior level), building the response capacity and capability to include review and revision of plans, refresher training for EOC staff and finding additional capacity for staffing EOCs, and a third block to review and enhance existing arrangements. It is recommended the Group introduce the following improvements:

### ***Familiarisation***

- Familiarisation of the Joint Committee and CEG in the Group's arrangements and their roles in them.
- Clarify, differentiate and workshop the roles of the GECC and Group Controller with the role of the local EOC and Local Controllers in a response that is managed at the local level, and in the situation when a regional response is required.
- Workshop response roles for Mayors and Chief Executives.

### ***Building Response Capacity and Capability***

- Revision of the Group's operational plans particularly for warnings and alerts;
- Identify the source of the capacity required to operate an EOC for an extended period;
- Provide training for those assigned to key EOC roles and in particular the Planning, Logistics, Welfare and PIM functions.

### ***Review and Enhancement***

- Review the function of EMBOP to ensure the structure serves member councils and communities; and,
- Continue to foster relationships and plans with partners, particularly with iwi in rural communities.

- 5.3 The *Familiarisation* tasks can be undertaken separately from the tasks of *Building Response Capacity* and the *Review and Enhancement* of existing arrangements. The familiarisation should be based on the Group Plan and its arrangements, and ideally should be completed first to enable seniors to lead and commit to the identification of staff for roles in an EOC and their training.
- 5.4 The capacity to manage a response depends on having the right number of people available for the key functions and having them trained in the procedures. Before the training can take place it would be important for the plans and processes to be reviewed to ensure they are relevant. Capacity in Planning, Logistics, Welfare and Public Information Management is a particular weakness in CDEM. But without those functions staffed adequately, any response will be reactive rather than proactive and focus on the immediate rather than the longer term.
- 5.5 In the third tranche, it will be important to reaffirm the role and structure of EMBOP and particularly around ensuring member councils have the confidence that EMBOP is to support and serve their CDEM needs in all four Rs. Of course, EMBOP is unable to manage a response on its own. It relies on the participation of numerous partners and for their support to be effective, EMBOP and Group have to foster the relationships and plan for their involvement.

## 6. Conclusions

- 6.1 The review was tasked with looking at the structural arrangements, relationships and the processes used to provide CDEM in the Bay of Plenty. The review analysed the legislative requirements and the arrangements in place and found that the Bay of Plenty CDEM Group meets all the requirements of the legislation, and the structural arrangements are satisfactory. The Group Plan was considered to be full and an effective explanation and a good guide to the arrangements, roles and responsibilities. It explains the role of the Joint Committee and CEG, and the role of Mayors in making declarations, although it does not guide Mayors, Chief Executives and CEG members on their roles in a response.
- 6.2 The review found some members of the Joint Committee had a weak understanding of how the arrangements for CDEM in the region and their role in it was intended to operate. Members of the Joint Committee, and to a lesser extent members of CEG, would benefit from a formal induction programme and workshops to discuss and familiarise them on how the arrangements operate. The Joint Committee could also improve its governance of CDEM in the region by placing greater emphasis on monitoring a programme of work based on improving risk reduction, readiness and response capabilities in the region, and include monitoring the capacity and capability in the Group for GECC and EOC functions, the development of plans and procedures, and the relationships maintained by CDEM with key regional partners.
- 6.3 There is a risk that CDEM in the region is not given the priority, emphasis and commitment by members of the Joint Committee and the CEG, outside the immediacy of a response. CDEM roles are secondary functions for most council staff except for the CDEM staff controlled by EMBOP. Appointments to key GECC/EOC positions are not always at the best level, and when coupled with poor knowledge of CDEM procedures and low attendance at training, the effectiveness of the response can be jeopardised. A sound appreciation of roles and responsibilities in the Group would mitigate that risk.
- 6.4 The structure of EMBOP and the Group office works well but its design and function is not clearly understood by some councils, which causes tension. There is an opportunity to review and discuss the model to ensure contributing councils understand its benefits and to ensure EMBOP can develop a culture that supports councils and their communities, not just in the response but also in the period before a response.
- 6.5 The response to the flooding caused by Cyclone Debbie and the later response to the potential impact of Cyclone Cook were in accordance with the Group Plan and entirely consistent with the guidance and approach suggested by the legislation and the Ministry of Civil Defence & Emergency Management. The response benefitted from the considerable input by the Director of EMBOP and the CDEM staff in planning and preparation for such a response, and indicated clear understanding by EMBOP staff of the delineation between GECC and local EOC functions. The GECC provided advice

to the Controller and arranged for supplementary staff as fatigue set in. The Whakatane District Council had a good Local Controller in place and willing EOC staff. However deeper planning and better training before the response would have lifted the performance to an even higher level and particularly in welfare and the procedures for establishing Civil Defence Centres for impacted communities, and having staff trained to lead those activities. Better planning should involve closer co-operation by CDEM with the regional Flood Team to enhance flood warning processes and closer connections, and better linkages with key segments of the community and in particular iwi and the rural sector. A programme of community-based response planning, including marae preparedness, would provide a standardised approach to community responses, stronger connections between communities and the EOC, and encourage local initiative and self-sufficiency. The aim should be to advance these relationships to get to the point “of doing it with us, not having it done to us”.

- 6.6 The review found there was nothing in the legislation that would hinder an effective response in the region. The Group has solid foundations in place as evidenced by the guidance and procedures available and used during the response. But the superstructure would benefit from some enhancement by better understandings of how the processes are designed to operate, and ensuring the Bay of Plenty has the right capacity and skills available, training has taken place, the plans and procedures are appropriate, and the personnel involved have the commitment to CDEM and the right attitude. The review suggests a way ahead involving familiarisation, developing response capacity to include review and revision of plans, refresher training for EOC staff and finding additional capacity for staffing EOCs, and the review and enhancement of the existing arrangements.

## 7. Recommendations

It is recommended that the Bay of Plenty CDEM Group should:

1. Conduct workshops for members of the Joint Committee and CEG based on the arrangements provided in the legislation and the Group Plan to clarify their roles and responsibilities;
2. Require that the membership of the CEG should be at the highest level to enhance management and development of CDEM in the region;
3. Introduce as common practice, CDEM staff informing CEG members of developing threats and the approach they intend for managing them;
4. Review the function of EMBOP to ensure the structure of civil defence emergency management in the region serves member councils and communities in a response and in the periods before and after a response;
5. Conduct workshops to clarify the functions and the relationship between the GECC and local EOCs and enhance understanding and procedures;
6. Amend the Group Plan to match the Group's policy for the cross-accreditation of Controllers from one local authority to others in the Group to provide additional capacity;
7. Provide regular refresher training for all Controllers;
8. Review the relationship between the Regional Council's Flood Team, EMBOP staff and EOCs to ensure information passed between them is clear, conveys assessed risk and is passed swiftly;
9. Review the guidance for selecting Civil Defence Centres to be used in any given emergency event to ensure facilities are appropriate;
10. Selects sufficient suitable staff and volunteers in each district and trains them in both the EOC welfare function and the establishment and functioning of a Civil Defence Centre;
11. Ensure the PIM function has the capacity that enables it to provide proactive messages to the community using all the channels available;
12. Provide resources separate from the PIM function to manage a Visits Co-ordination function during a response; and
13. Implement greater engagement with communities, particularly Maori and rural, through the Marae Preparedness Programme and community emergency response planning.

## Appendices

**Appendix 1: Project Brief**

**Appendix 2: List of People Interviewed**

**Appendix 3: Cross Reference of Project Scope Items to Report Sections**

**Appendix 4: Glossary**

Appendix 1 to  
Review of Bay of Plenty CDEM Group Response

## Appendix 1: Project Brief

	<h1>Project Brief</h1>
<b>Project title:</b>	<b>Ex-Tropical Cyclone Cook and Debbie Group Response Review</b>
<b>Project class:</b>	<b>Minor</b>
<b>Sponsor:</b>	<b>Garry Poole, Chair Bay of Plenty CDEM Coordinating Executive Group</b>
<b>Business owner:</b>	<b>Clinton Naude, Director Emergency Management Bay of Plenty</b>
<b>Project manager:</b>	<b>Matthew Harrex, Manager Planning &amp; Development</b>
<b>Date: 20 June 2017</b>	<b>Group: Emergency Management Bay of Plenty</b>
<b>Ref:A2612404</b>	

### 1 Introduction

The Bay of Plenty faced two significant weather events during the month of April 2017. Between 5 and 21 April the Bay of Plenty Civil Defence Emergency Management Group were actively responding to the impacts of Ex-Tropical Cyclones Debbie and Cook.

Ex-Tropical Cyclone Debbie brought widespread rain across the Bay of Plenty on already saturated soils. The Whakatane District was most significantly impacted with flooding and landslides damaging and isolating some of the small rural communities. The Whakatane River overtopped the banks south of the township flooding properties around Poroporo. The Rangitaiki river breached the stop bank at Edgecumbe flooding a large part of the town. More than 290 dwellings were flooded above the floor level and 14 of these severely damaged. Over 1600 residents were evacuated from their properties in Edgecumbe. Other parts of the region were impacted including flooding on the lower reaches of the Kaituna River and several landslides affecting properties in Ōmokoroa. A local state of emergency was declared for the Whakatane District on 6 April.

A local state of emergency was declared for the entire Bay of Plenty on 11 April, in anticipation of the impacts of Ex-Tropical Cyclone Cook which impacted the Bay of Plenty on the evening of 13 April 2017. This brought more heavy rain to the region particularly in the west. Strong damaging winds were more

focussed in the east. Power cuts were widespread and many roads were cut off as a result. Low lying parts of the Bay of Plenty Coast were evacuated in anticipation of Ex-Tropical Cyclone Cook generating significant storm surges to the coast. Landslides in Omokoroa forced the evacuation of 6 properties. The region wide declaration was terminated on 14 April. And simultaneously a local state of emergency was declared for the Whakatane District to provide for ongoing response efforts to Edgecumbe. On 21 April the local state of emergency expired and was replaced by a Notice of Local Transition Period.

These are the first declared civil defence emergencies in the Bay of Plenty since the Matata Debris Flow and Tauranga landslides in May 2005.

On 5 May 2017 the Bay of Plenty Civil Defence Emergency Management Coordinating Executive Group (CEG) discussed the opportunity to understand the Bay of Plenty Civil Defence Emergency Management Group's (the Group) response to the events. CEG considered this an opportunity to review the recent events to identify opportunities for improvement, to confirm best practise and to understand challenges which may be included for consideration into the National Review of Civil Defence Emergency Management being undertaken.

### 1.1 Purpose

The Group seeks to review the recent significant events of Ex- Tropical Cyclones Debbie and Cook to ensure that the Group's capability to deliver Civil Defence Emergency Management is enhanced.

### 1.2 Dependencies

The Post Event Report compiled following operational debriefs from the events is due for completion at the end of May and will be a key document available to inform this review.

### 1.3 Project description

The successful outcome of this project will:

- Identify best practices in the Bay of Plenty CDEM Group that supported the response to the April 2017 weather events.
- Identify opportunities for the Group to improve its response capability.

### 1.4 Scope of project

The review will focus on the structural arrangements, relationships and processes in the Bay of Plenty. It will look at

- CDEM Legislation
  - Consideration of the question does the current legislation enable or hinder an effective response capability during an emergency event?
- Command & Control

- Consideration of the operational response role versus non response role of Joint Committee as a collective and the individual roles of Mayors of City/District Councils and the Chair of the Regional Council.
- Consideration of the operational response role versus non response role of the Coordinating Executive Group as a collective and the roles of the respective member council and agency executives.
- Consideration of the operational response role versus non response roles of the group and local controllers
- Roles & Responsibilities
  - Consideration of the role of the Group Emergency Coordination Centre (GECC) and that of the Local Emergency Operations Centre (EOC) and how the two levels worked together.
  - Consideration of the capability and capacity of Group Emergency Coordination Centre (GECC) and that of the Local Emergency Operations Centre (EOC) to provide an effective and sustained response. This aspect to consider the allocated and available staffing resource, the skill sets and trained state of staff in the response.
  - Consideration of role of Emergency Management Bay of Plenty and how this affected the Group's capability to respond to the events.
  - Consideration of the role of key partner agencies including but not limited to NZ Police, NZ Fire Service and Health Sector.
  - Consideration of the role of the Ministry of Civil Defence Emergency Management and the National Crises Management Centre (NCMC).
- Communications
  - Consideration of the capability and capacity to provide effective public information management at both a Group level and at a Local level.
  - Consideration of the effective engagement with the various mediums of communication such as television, radio, print, social media and websites.

It is noted that there are three related reviews simultaneously being undertaken.

- Bay of Plenty Regional Council commissioned *Rangitaiki River Scheme Review* – Lead by Sir Michael Cullen
- Whakatane District Council commissioned *Local CDEM Response Review* – Lead by David Brunsdon, Kestrel Group
- National CDEM Review – Chaired by Roger Sowry

The Bay of Plenty CDEM Group review will not seek to duplicate the scope and intent of the reviews of the Bay of Plenty Regional Council or Whakatāne District Council and will inform a corrective action plan to enhance and improve the CDEM Group response to emergency events.

Appendix 2 to  
Review of Bay of Plenty CDEM Group Response

## Appendix 2: List of People Interviewed

Doug Leeder	Chair Bay of Plenty Regional Council
David Love	Councillor Bay of Plenty Regional Council
Mary-Anne Macleod	Chief Executive Bay of Plenty Regional Council
Chris Ingle	Bay of Plenty Regional Council
Sue-Ellen Craig	Bay of Plenty Regional Council
Greg Brownless	Mayor Tauranga City Council
Garry Poole	Chief Executive Tauranga City Council
Paul Davidson	Alt Controller Tauranga City Council
Tony Bonne	Mayor Whakatane District Council
Ross Boreham	Whakatane District Council
Clinton Naude	Director, Emergency Management Bay of Plenty (EMBOP)
Angela Reade	Emergency Management Bay of Plenty (EMBOP)
Jono Meldrum	Emergency Management Bay of Plenty (EMBOP)
Insp Kevin Taylor	New Zealand Police
Ron Devlin	Fire and Emergency Service New Zealand
Angela Bell	Ministry for Primary Industry Rotorua
Shaneen Simpson-Almond	Te Puni Kokiri
David Coetzee	Ministry of Civil Defence & Emergency Management
Jenna Rogers	Ministry of Civil Defence & Emergency Management
John Titmus	Ministry of Civil Defence & Emergency Management
Suzanne Vowles	Ministry of Civil Defence & Emergency Management

Appendix 3 to  
Review of Bay of Plenty CDEM Group Response

### Appendix 3: Cross Reference of Project Scope Items to Report Sections

Project Scope Item	Report Reference
<b>CDEM Legislation</b> Does the current legislation enable or hinder an effective response capability during an emergency event?	2.1 5.1
<b>Command and Control</b> Operational response role versus non-response role of Joint Committee as a collective and individual roles of Mayors and Chair of Regional Council	2.2 2.3 2.8
<b>Command and Control</b> Operational response role versus non-response role of the Coordinating Executives Group as a collective and the roles of the respective member council and agency executives	2.4
<b>Command and Control</b> Operational response role versus non response roles of group and local controllers	2.8 2.9
<b>Roles and Responsibilities</b> Role of GECC and that of the local EOC and how the two levels worked together	2.7
<b>Roles and Responsibilities</b> Capability and capacity of GECEC and local EOC to provide effective and sustained response	2.9
<b>Roles and Responsibilities</b> Role of EMBOP and how this affected the Group's capability to respond to events	2.6
<b>Roles and Responsibilities</b> Role of key partner agencies including but not limited to Police, Fire and health sector	3.1 3.2 3.4 3.5
<b>Roles and Responsibilities</b> Role of MCDEM and the NCMC	4.0
<b>Communications</b>	3.3

Appendix 4 to  
Review of Bay of Plenty CDEM Group Response

## Appendix 4: Glossary

Term	Description
BOP	Bay of Plenty
BOP Region	The Bay of Plenty Region as defined in the Local Government (Bay of Plenty Region) Reorganisation Order 1989
BOPRC	The Bay of Plenty Regional Council
CD Centre	Civil Defence Centre - a facility in a community that is set up during an emergency to support individuals, families/whānau, and the community
CDEM	Civil Defence Emergency Management
CDEM Act	Civil Defence Emergency Management Act 2002 (the legislation which sets the framework for emergency management in New Zealand)
CDEM Group	Civil Defence Emergency Management Group
CDEM Group Office or GEMO	The Emergency Management Office established under the EMBOP Constitution
CDEM Group Plan	The Civil Defence Emergency Management Group Plan (current version 2012 – 2016) developed in accordance with Section 48 of the CDEM Act. This plan provides a framework for civil defence and emergency management decisions to be made across the applicable Group
CEG	Co-ordinating Executive Group - a statutorily-mandated group established under s.20(1) of the CDEM Act to provide advice and implementation support to regional CDEM groups
Emergency event	An event that poses an immediate risk to life, health, property, or the environment that requires a co-ordinated response
EMBOP	Emergency Management Bay of Plenty – the group of six councils formed to act as the Group Emergency Management Office for the Bay of Plenty CDEM Group, and to provide the operational service delivery of CDEM activities for the six member councils. Rotorua is not a member of EMBOP but is a member of the regional CDEM Group.
NCMC	National Crisis Management Centre



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